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Structural Aspects of Multinational
Corporate Trade with the
Nonmarket Economies of Eastern
Europe: An MNC Perspective on
Domestic and Foreign Regulation
JOHN G. SCRIVEN
In considering the structural aspects of multinational cor-
porate trade relationships with the nonmarket economies of Eastern Europe,
it is important, as a preliminary matter, to acknowledge certain intractable
features of that trade. Only through a continuing awareness of the interplay
of these factors can one hope to understand the role of law or regulation in
trade with these states.
Foremost is the recognition that the multinational corporation (MNC),
in dealing with a nonmarket economy, is entering an economic environ-
ment with assumptions antithetical to its own. To the extent that the MNC
hopes to satisfy the trade demand of the nonmarket state, the MNC must
allow for a margin of compromise and deviation from its normal modes of
doing business. Such an approach, however, is necessarily mutual; the
nonmarket economy government, to the extent it seeks to engage in inter-
national trading relationships with the Western market economies, must do
so in partnership with the latter's evolutionary modality of international
trade, the MNC. In so doing, it must also compromise somewhat in its
ideological and practical requirements.
This need for pragmatism and compromise is being recognized to vary-
ing extents by the nonmarket economies of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA). 1 Their economic imperatives have led to a blossoming of
trade with MNCs, especially from the United States and the Federal German
Republic, as well as from the other Western democracies. Their Marxist
principles have been compromised within their domestic economies to meet
the requirements of foreign investment. For example, the Soviet Union and
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Poland have recently indicated their willingness to work with capitalist re-
sources in the form of leased equipment. 2 A number of organizations from
the CMEA states have established themselves in the market economies 3 and
for a number of years the Soviet Union has been operating a bank in
Switzerland.4
Without such flexibility on the part of these regimes, the complicated
commercial arrangements which exist today between the CMEA members
and the Western MNCs could never have developed. Although these develop-
ments have opened up a large market for U.S., Western, European, and
Japanese business, it can be argued that this trade has been equally impor-
tant over the past decade for the political stability of the Eastern bloc, par-
ticularly some of the satellite states, in that it has contributed to a move
toward consumerism.
5
The practical difficulty that arises for purposes of this inquiry, then, is
how to produce regulations which are representative of the various economic
systems at play in the world, since any regulation which lacks the mutuality
necessary for cooperation between such competing philosophies may tend to
stultify the natural evolution of international industrial cooperation.
The second important factor which affects the current structure of
MNC-CMEA trade relationships is the serious economic problems which the
CMEA states are experiencing.6 Over the last few years these countries have
financed their growing demands for Western goods and technology by bor-
rowing in the Western convertible currency market. At the same time they
have run up a trade deficit with the Western democracies of U.S. $3.3
billion.7 This means today that many of the CMEA countries have exhausted
their convertible currency reserves and have little or no such currency left,
either to buy goods and technology, or even to service their outstanding loan
obligations.
With an outstanding convertible currency debt at the end of 1978 of
U.S. $15 billion out of total CMEA indebtedness of U.S. $38.8 billion, Poland
seems to be in the most perilous condition. At the present time many Euro-
pean bankers view this situation with deep concern. However, this concern is
not shared by their North American colleagues who anticipate an increase in
convertible currency exposure which will hopefully be funded by the planned
increase in exports by the Eastern bloc.
This convertible currency problem which in fact emanates from the
failures of the CMEA economies to achieve their planned goals, affects both
the satellite CMEA states and the Soviet Union. In 1978 the Soviet deficit in
trade with the West increased dramatically, partly due to increased grain
purchases which it was forced to cover in part by selling its entire annual
production of gold. In 1979 it was projected that the grain harvest would be
even worse, the U.S. Department of Agriculture expecting a 50 million ton
shortfall. The consequent purchases of grain in convertible currency will put
an additional strain on the Soviet Union's ability to purchase Western tech-
nology and equipment over the next year.
8
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Such economic developments dominate all aspects of East-West trade
today and in particular have led to a vast barter system between the Western
industrialized democracies and the CMEA bloc. The impact on MNCs of this
trading pattern, commonly called countertrade, will be discussed later.
The final factor in the relationships between MNCs and CMEA states
which cannot be underestimated is the impact of wholly independent politi-
cal decisions. Though this factor is not limited to trade with the nonmarket
economy states, the monopolistic organizational structure of foreign trade in
the socialist countries renders it peculiarly and immediately susceptible to
variations in the political climate between the two national trading partners
involved.
Bearing in mind these critical factors, this article will discuss the fol-
lowing particular aspects of MNC trade with CMEA states: (1) the orga-
nizational structure, in general, of foreign trade with nonmarket economies,
(2) the impact of domestic antitrust law on MNC trade with CMEA states,
and (3) recent developments in CMEA regulation which affect the structure
of trade with MNCs.
THE GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MNC TRADE WITH
CMEA STATES
In dealing with nonmarket economies, the MNC enters an economic envi-
ronment inimical to its own. Thus it is worthwhile to reconsider certain basic
aspects of socialist trading and economic concepts.
The long-term consequences for the socialist states of the penetration of
their domestic markets by capitalist enterprises provides one of the most
interesting perspectives on the growing East-West trade relationships. Many
in the West feel that such developments are essential for world stability and
may lead to some relaxation in those states both in terms of the flexibility of
their economic concepts and also in human freedoms. 9 In fact, there are
signs that this is already happening. Moreover, the Soviet Union appears to
be equally enthusiastic. Professor Maximova, of the Institute for World Econ-
omy and International Relations in Moscow, said recently: "We are not going
to demand that Western countries should give up their traditional system of
economic management, although as Marxists we consider it to be a transi-
tional stage giving way in the future to a more progressive form-a planning
system of economic management."1 ° Whether in fact this position can be
supported in the light of recent trends, such as the move toward leasing
aforementioned and the approaches contained in new foreign investment
legislation to be discussed, is perhaps open to question.
MNCs, in their relations with CMEA members, must deal with a num-
ber of monopolies. The state has a monopoly in all economic activities, both
internal and external. Article 14(h) of the Constitution of the Soviet Union
states: "The competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as repre-
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sented by its highest agencies of state power and agencies of state adminis-
tration shall embrace ... foreign trade on the basis of a state monopoly."
Within the statewide economic monopoly operate lesser monopolies.'" The
state delegates to its specific agencies specific monopolies, somewhat as the
Crown in England granted monopolies in the Middle Ages, the vestigial
remains of which are the patent monopoly. Of course, the Ministry of Fore-
ign Trade has a monopoly in all aspects of foreign trade.'
2
These lesser monopolies are further diluted. Under the aegis of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade state agencies are established and granted a mo-
nopoly in certain aspects of foreign trade. These agencies are denominated
foreign trade organizations (FTOs).' 3
These state companies are founded by a ministry of state or other organ
of national authority, and under the laws of the respective socialist states are
considered independent legal indentities. The state provides them with cer-
tain assets which they may use independently. They are liable for the dis-
charge of their obligations up to the amount of the assets entrusted to them
and these assets cannot, generally speaking, be removed from their control.'4
The juridical independence of these state foreign trade organizations has
been recognized judicially in a number of Western countries. '5 Nonetheless
FTOs, in fact, work under the close supervision of their founding agency.'
6
Moreover, the power of the executive in the socialist countries to issue regu-
lations and instructions and to informally govern all activities within the state
is vastly greater than is the case in the Western democracies.
This actual and implict interrelationship between the FTO and the state
through the Ministry of Foreign Trade is the inevitable consequence of the
socialist concept of a planned economy. 7 The activities of the FTO are gov-
erned by its annual and five-year plans, which are a part of the annual and
five-year plans of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which are in turn a part of
the overall state annual and five-year plans. These plans are a synthesis of
the plans of all the component parts of the state apparatus; once accepted by
the Communist Party and, in the case of the Soviet Union, by the Supreme
Soviet, they have the force of law.' 8
The concepts of state monopoly and the planned economy are main-
tained in pristine purity only in the fountainhead of communism, the Soviet
Union, and its more conservative allies, the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR). Other CMEA
members have modified their economies to allow for the play of some market
forces. For example, since the Economic Reform in Hungary (1967-69) the
monopoly of the FTOs has been broken or at least extended so that indus-
trial enterprises could engage directly in foreign trade.'9 So far, more than
100 Hungarian enterprises have been authorized to deal directly with foreign
companies. Some prices are also "free," i.e., subject to market forces.2 0 And
three countries-Hungary, Poland, and Romania-permit, at least theoreti-
cally, direct foreign investment.
The organization of the nonmarket economy is a predominant factor for
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MNCs in East-West trade, and its bureaucratic rigidity is a continuing frus-
tration for many Western businessmen. On the other hand the socialist plan-
ners, particularly at the present time, are frustrated by the "unstable, crisis-
inclined nature of the world capitalist market," as they perceive it. There
have been calls for a "symbiosis of the planned and market systems." 21
In fact many of the transactions in East-West trade have been uniquely
structured in a legal format that in practice has allowed each partner to
achieve its specific goals. 2 The structure of these transactions has substan-
tially mitigated the concern of many Western firms about their inability to
participate in what may be a substantial investment through the traditional
means of a corporate entity with the equivalent of a board of directors and
dividend payments.' The forms that have been employed in this trade will
sometimes give an advantage to the MNC over smaller companies in dealing
with the nonmarket economies. The Soviet Union, particularly, because of its
need for very large-scale projects, prefers to deal with large multinational
corporations rather than a group of smaller companies.24 Finally, all of the
CMEA states desire to have their trade relationships encompassed within the
umbrella of bilateral intergovernmental relationships, a factor which in-
creases the impact of political decisions upon trading relationships.
DOMESTIC REGULATION: IMPACT OF THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS ON
MNC TRADE WITH CMEA STATES
It is appropriate now to consider how far these imperatives have been recog-
nized by domestic regulation in the United States, and to examine in particu-
lar the impact of domestic antitrust law on MNC trade with nonmarket
economies. Since the Alcoa case in 1945, the U.S. courts have exercised
jurisdiction to decide upon the activities of legal entities operating outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 25 This doctrine of extraterritorial-
ity, felt by many to be a form of judicial imperialism, has been extended over
the years beyond the antitrust area.26 Of course, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. laws also reaches the activities of the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
MNCs.
With the growth of trade and industrial cooperation between U.S. MNCs
and the CMEA countries, the U.S. Justice Department has been forced to
take a position on the potential antitrust aspects of such relationships. The
most recent and enlightening statements on this subject are contained in the
Antitrust Guide for International Operations issued by the Justice Depart-
ment on January 26, 1977. These have been supplemented by comments
made by Joel Davidow before the Advisory Committee on East-West Trade of
the U.S. Department of Commerce on March 10, 1976, which in turn were
amplified in an article published in 1978.27
It is unnecessary to consider all aspects of the Guide for International
Operations, but it is appropriate to highlight some concerns of the Justice
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Department in respect of East-West trade. Four potential areas of concern
have been discussed: (1) exchange of information, (2) selling cooperation,
(3) buying cooperation, and (4) patent and know-how licensing with reexport
restrictions.
28
Of course, the general rule is that U.S. antitrust law is applicable to any
concerted restraint on competition which occurs abroad only if the intended
and actual effect is to injure U.S. trade. In this context one is compelled by
experience to agree with the conclusion set out in the Justice Department's
guide "that a very large proportion of international business transactions
involving American firms and/or American markets usually will not involve
violations of U.S. antitrust law because such transactions will not adversely
affect U.S. consumers or competitors."'29 In the case of East-West trade this
position is emphasized by the extreme paucity of judicial precedent.
30
Exchanges of information among competitors involved in East-West
trade seem to be acceptable, if made for the sake of gaining experience or
learning. Even if there is an intention to achieve a united front in buying or
selling, it is unlikely that such an exchange would be illegal under the U.S.
antitrust laws.
The Webb-Pomerene Act 3' permits U.S. exporters to join together in
associations for the sale of goods abroad at uniform prices and it is felt by Mr.
Davidow, for one, that joint selling abroad will not be illegal so long as it
produces no adverse effects on U.S. consumers or competitors. The same is
true for joint buying arrangements which are entered into by U.S. companies
solely for the purpose of securing a lower price for U.S. consumers. However,
the Justice Department recommends that "U.S. firms should avoid secret
collusive arrangements in selling abroad, even when dealing with a monopo-
listic state buying agency, since such a buyer, like any other, is entitled to a
fair nondeceptive treatment."32 Such an attitude, whose premises merit seri-
ous and challenging consideration, reflects the general support of the U.S.
Justice Department for the direction being taken by United Nations organs
in respect of the regulation of restrictive business practices in international
trade.
Nevertheless, joint ventures and consortia for major commercial projects
in nonmarket economies, although almost always involving selling and buy-
ing, are normally acceptable so long as weaker firms are not unfairly
excluded." Fortunately this view coincides with practical realities. As previ-
ously mentioned the Soviet Union is mainly interested in extremely large-scale
industrial complexes and projects. Many of these (there are now over thirty)
are beyond the technological and financial resources of a single partner. To
this extent current demands of East-West trade tend to significantly favor
concentration of assets. The need for some sort of joint venture arrangement is
almost inevitable except where one of the largest MNCs is involved. This
becomes further complicated by the Soviet Union's desire to have buy-back
compensation arrangements to finance its convertible currency obligations
under these projects.
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The Justice Department's greatest concern in East-West trade is the
imposition of export restrictions in licensing arrangements with state-owned
enterprises in nonmarket economies. These export prohibitions are intended
by the licensing company to forestall the export of goods by such state
monopolies at unreasonably low prices into Western markets. The depart-
ment's position is that prohibitions on exports back to the United States
may be illegal if they relate to products not produced by the licensed tech-
nology or last longer than a reasonable estimate of the life of the know-how
involved. Moreover, the Justice Department believes that the U.S. corpora-
tions' fears can be adequately addressed under the U.S. antidumping laws.
34
Further, in the view of the department, prohibition of exports to Western
Europe is not violative of U.S. antitrust laws since it does not affect U.S.
commerce.35 In fact, many MNCs conduct their East-West trade from
Vienna and therefore remain effectively outside the jurisdiction of the EEC
authorities as well.36
The present posture of the Justice Department is rather nebulous and
unspecific. Its position seems to be based solely on the general principle of
intended and actual adverse effect on U.S. commerce. This is very under-
standable considering both the intense political environment in which East-
West trade exists and the lack of specific judicial guidance.
As a general observation, U.S. MNCs seem to be able to deal successfully
with the monopolies of the nonmarket states without any modification of their
general commitment to competition. This may be accounted for by the fact
that the very size of the domestic U.S. economy places U.S. companies in a
position of strength when dealing with such state enterprises, a factor con-
sidered subsequently in this article. Thus, a substantial concentration of assets
and economic power will often present opportunities which would not other-
wise exist for U.S firms in their dealings with nonmarket economies.
The biggest concern of U.S. companies seems to be with "whip-sawing"
tactics sometimes employed by FTOs, whereby the later play the offers of
potential suppliers off against each other and so utilize their monopolistic
position to beat down the price offered.3 7 This tactic is not peculiar to the
nonmarket economies and may be found among domestic buyers. U.S. cor-
porations experienced in East-West trade can deal with this phenomenon
through long-term trading relationships with FTOs in their respective indus-
tries and through competent market research.
Another aspect of trade with CMEA states, the increasing use of coun-
tertrade arrangements, perhaps has potential ramifications for domestic anti-
trust liability. Such schemes, which are becoming an essential feature of
East-West trade, require that any sale in convertible currency by a Western
supplier shall be offset by a purchase in convertible currency of an equivalent
amount by that supplier from its CMEA trading partner.38 The reciprocity
implicit in countertrade requirements, even where there is no contractual
linkage between the sale and the counterpurchase (which is often the case),
seems to chafe against some aspects of U.S. antitrust philosophy. The de-
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mands of such arrangements also favor large corporations at the expense of
the smaller ones, since the latter will often not have the ability to absorb such
counterpurchases within their own raw material requirements or may lack
the ability to sell them in their own markets.
To the extent that the effects of countertrade requirements are felt on
the U.S. domestic market, some judicial guidance may be developed which
will amplify the unresolved antitrust aspects of East-West trade.
In contrast, it is the anticompetitive or protectionist legislation of the
United States, the Trade Act of 1974,' 9 which has had most influence recently
on trade with the CMEA bloc. The use of the market disruption provisions of
§ 406 of the Act, while not necessarily consistent with the aims of U.S. anti-
trust policy, provides some indication of the antitrust approach which might be
taken with respect to compensation and countertrade agreements.
This legislation has recently been used as an instrument of national
policy. It is premised on the existence of a fundamental difference between
the market and nonmarket economies which may place U.S. companies at a
disadvantage in certain circumstances. For example, some U.S. chemical
producers have attacked the famous compensation agreement made in 1973
between Occidental Petroleum and the Soviet Union. ° This agreement,
which is for a period of twenty years, requires inter alia an Occidental
subsidiary to purchase each year from the Soviets 1.2 million metric tons of
anhydrous ammonia. The U.S. producers complained that this arrangement
had caused market disruption of the domestic industry within the meaning of
the act because U.S. ammonia plants were running at about only 73 percent
of capacity, which was below the break-even point, and such imports were
causing the domestic producers either to sell at a loss or lose business. The
Trade Act considers that market disruption exists "whenever imports of an
article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by some domestic
industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a
significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic
industry."4 1 It should be noted that this test is intended to be more easily met
than the "substantial cause" test of § 201 of the Act (the "escape clause"
provision) which provides a more general protection against market disrup-
tion by imported products, a recognition, perhaps, of the special problems of
trading With nonmarket economies.
The International Trade Commission (ITC), after investigating the com-
plaint, determined by a three-to-two majority that market disruption did exist
in the Occidental case. It recommended to the president that a three-year
quota be imposed on U.S. imports of such ammonia from the Soviet Union.
In fact, on December 11, 1979, the president decided not to follow the rec-
ommendation of the ITC and determined that it was not in the national
interest to impose the recommended quotas. This decision was based upon
economic argumentation.4 2 Subsequently, by proclamation on January 21,
1980, the president reversed his decision. Taking emergency action under §
406(c) of the Trade Act, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanis-
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tan, he imposed the quotas which he had originally denied.43 Although for-
mally related to the economics of the situation, the decision was clearly a use
of the act as an instrument of national policy in extreme circumstances. As
such its impact on future East-West trade relationships may not be so severe.
Although not the first agreement subject to a Trade Act complaint,4 4 the
anhydrous ammonia complaint is the most significant, because the agreement
initially had the blessing of the U.S. Exim Bank and the U.S. Department of
Commerce; the State Department also stated that it was in the best interests of
the United States. Moreover, since the Occidental deal was made, the CMEA
economies have seriously declined to the point where without such compensa-
tion and countertrade arrangements the CMEA states are not in a position to
purchase Western goods and technology, countertrade being essential to gen-
erate the convertible currency necessary to make such purchases.
Furthermore, the complaint and the Trade Act upon which it is based
create difficulties in commercial planning, since due to changes in the do-
mestic market situation a long-term arrangement apparently may be chal-
lenged much later, and perhaps repeatedly, in the course of its implementa-
tion. A success against Occidental may well have deterred other companies
from entering into similar arrangements even with governmental support.
Many MNCs are now forced into compensation arrangements in order to
maintain even their present level of trading with CMEA FTOs. Some li-
censers of technology have faced countertrade requirements which are as
much as 140 percent of the value of the licensed technology. One MNC, the
Pepsi-Cola Company, may be watching Occidental's experience with the
ITC. In return for the right to supply two bottling and mixing plants in
Bulgaria and to supply those plants with its concentrate it has entered into a
200 percent countertrade commitment which requires it to purchase Bulgar-
ian bottles, confectionaries, mineral waters, furniture, electric and diesel
forklift trucks, and wine.
4 5
In conclusion (and further confirming the Justice Department's view)
one can say that for most operations of large U.S. MNCs the domestic legisla-
tion is not a problem. Many of their sales are from their facilities in Western
Europe and the countertrade products are usually utilized in these same
facilities or sold off to European-based traders for disposal. Thus, domestic
jurisdiction would rarely be obtained.
CMEA REGULATION OF MNC TRADE
Recent Developments in CMEA States
Recently, national legislation concerning direct foreign investment in the
form of joint ventures has been enacted in three CMEA States; these efforts
have considerable impact on the structure of MNC trade relationships with
these countries. The problem of permitting a capitalist presence within a
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socialist economy remains an open issue in these countries. The more con-
servative states-the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the CSSR-do not permit
such activity; only Romania, 46 Hungary, 47 and Poland48 at present have laws
permitting direct foreign investment. The Bulgarian authorities have indi-
cated that a joint-venture law is in preparation.
The most striking feature of these local enactments is that they have
chosen, for the implementation of such projects, a familiar capitalist modal-
ity-the joint stock company-very often relying on prerevolution legislation
to prescribe incorporation details. By their very participation in a joint venture
organized under traditional capitalist legal concepts, MNCs in CMEA coun-
tries are involved in the internal cultural, social, and political activities of the
host country. This is in sharp contrast with the Yugoslavian joint-venture leg-
islation which requires the foreign partner to invest directly in one of the do-
mestic legal entities peculiar to that country's self-management system-the
organization of associated labor49 (such capitalistic forms of business organiza-
tion as the joint stock company having been totally abolished). Nor is profit a
recognized concept; rather the foreign partner shares in the net income of the
work organization in the way specified in the joint-venture agreement.5
0
In 1977 Hungary followed the Romanian example by permitting the for-
eign partner to participate directly in the production process; 51 previously the
foreign corporation had been represented only in the joint holding company
established primarily for marketing the production of the domestic manufac-
turing unit utilizing the foreign partner's technology. Because this revision did
not produce the interest in foreign investment that had been hoped for, in July
1979 Hungary published an explanatory decree which deals with the Western
companies' concerns on accounting, taxation, profit transfer, repatriation of
capital, and sales restrictions. Poland this year issued a similar decree,5 2 for-
eign investment in Poland having been previously limited to "units of the
non-socialized economy."
53
Joint ventures form part of the domestic economy, operating in local
currencies (although this is not always so in Romania) and becoming part of
the national plan. Apart from the fact that no foreign investor may have more
than 49 percent of the equity of the joint venture, the decrees contain none
of the kind of terminology being discussed in the development of suprana-
tional codes. There is no reference to the environment, transfer prices, or the
evaluation of technology except for some minor provisions in the new Polish
regulations. 54 Apart from the organizational aspects of the joint venture, the
main concern of the legislation is that sufficient foreign exchange be gener-
ated both for the benefit of the domestic economy, and also for the payment
of royalties and profits to the foreign partner.55 The details of the cooperation
are determined by the partners during negotiations and embodied in a joint
venture agreement.
It is proper to point out that in negotiation some other issues do emerge
which touch on sensitive areas. Because of the planned nature of the do-
mestic economy the foreign investor will usually share with its domestic
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partner a monopolistic position in the domestic market.56 The opportunity to
enjoy such a monopoly is an inevitable consequence of socialist planning.
The "closed economies" of the CMEA members are intended to create a
self-sufficient system of production. Even in normal trading activities,
MNCs, and indeed any prospective seller into a socialist economy, cannot
rely on the free enterprise standards of competition to make its sale:
No matter how much more reasonably priced, or more suitable [this]
product may be to the needs of the eastern European consumer than
similar goods available locally, a sale will not be consummated unless
the decision to buy fits prescribed government objectives. The Western
exporter has learned from experience that [it] cannot count on the tra-
ditional factors that enter into the determination of consumer choice,
(price, quality, utility) in order to secure the share of the market to
which it feels entitled by reason of the efficiency of [its] production and
the comparative value of [its] product.57
Thus in a joint venture the technology of the MNC helps to create local
production to replace previously imported production. The planned economy
is not competitive or market-oriented. It does not see the need for competi-
tion between its own production and foreign imports, or need the exclusion
of such imports formalized by tariff managements or quotas. The state plan
for a certain product will merely foresee that products previously imported
are now supplied from the domestic production of a certain factory (the joint
venture).
58
In the recent Polish foreign investment legislation specific provision is
made for the incorporation of such joint ventures within the national socio-
economic plan.59 Although this inclusion is somewhat tentative, perhaps be-
cause the Polish authorities are inexperienced with the impact of capitalist
forces on their economy, such joint ventures are clearly included within the
monopolistic centrally planned system.
CMEA states are, thus, not concerned with an MNC presence enjoying
a local monopoly. Their objective is an improvement in their convertible
currency balances, so that the big debate will be over the volume of exports
and who will handle them.
Also at the present time the Hungarians are placing particular emphasis
in detailed negotiations on the establishment of a research and development
capability with the joint venture. The volume of price for supplies of raw
materials by either partner to the joint venture will be another fundamental
issue.
In summary, the recent national legislation has been very general, allow-
ing the partners a great deal of flexibility to work out their own arrangement.
Control against potential exploitation of the domestic partner by the foreign
MNC is exercised through the licensing system in which the project will
require the consent of various ministries and agencies of the state bureau-
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cracy before its implementation may commence. The legal framework is
designed to satisfy certain basic concerns of the foreign investor regarding its
capital and the repatriation of profits and other sums due it. Such legislation
is a pragmatic solution, avoiding the inhibition of theoretical principles to
allow for the realization of tangible benefits to the domestic economy.
CMEA Approaches to MNC Concentration
The planned economies of the CMEA members essentially differ from mar-
ket economies in that they are not responsive to the forces of supply and
demand; that is, as noted earlier, they are not market-oriented. As such their
approach to the tendencies toward concentration among MNCs, which ap-
pear to be causing concern in some quarters within the Western industrial-
ized democracies, evidences a rather different perspective. Perhaps also the
relevant needs of the market economies in trading with the CMEA bloc may
be different than in trading with other regions.
One must remember that each of the CMEA economies is "adminis-
tered by a group of highly centralized, specialized and substantially nation-
alized industries, each of which has a monopoly in a particular area of the
economy. Each of these organizations has certain exclusive rights and func-
tions and no other organization either internally or externally may exercise
those rights or functions."60 Consumer choice, free pricing, size, and com-
petition are not relevant. They are vestiges of an "inferior" (capitalist) sys-
tem which the planned economy has superseded.6'
Accordingly, one would not expect to find provisions similar to the anti-
trust regulations existing in many of the Western democracies. 62 However, at
least one small example in this field does exist. When Hungary introduced in
1968 the "New Economic Mechanism," the pricing system was modified
from fixed official prices to allow for certain free prices. 63 Although these
prices mainly concerned trading by individuals and small groups outside the
socialized economy, the majority of imported products came within the free
price category. The relevant statute provides that
it shall be prohibited to enter into agreements on or in connection with
the prices of products directed at or resulting in the barring of the
emergence of competition, the creation of a monopolistic situation or
the obtaining of unlawful financial or marketing advantages. Agree-
ments defined in para (1) shall be null and void.64
However, since the price regulations have no extraterritorial effect they do
not cover foreign trade contracts made with foreign parties.6 5 Thus, even
this provision will not be applicable to MNCs either in regular foreign trade
activities for the reasons just stated or within the domestic economy, since
their joint venture projects will be within the basic economy where free
pricing does not apply.
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Although the CMEA members are not particularly concerned with MNC
concentration, they do seek modifications in their trading relationships with
the West. These have been most clearly articulated in the position of Group D
(the CMEA bloc) in the discussions on various Codes of Conduct being devel-
oped by UNCTAD and the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations.
The position of Group D in these discussions is equivocal. The members
feel that such Codes should not be applied to their own state enterprises.
66
They emphasize the need to observe the principles of sovereignty, equality,
mutual benefits, political and economic independence, and noninterference
in the internal affairs of countries,67 a position consistent with the nature of
their nonmarket economies.
However, Group D does postulate the prohibition of some practices, con-
sidered restrictive practices, by MNCs. These include the imposition of re-
strictions after expiration of agreements, exclusive grant-back provisions, re-
strictions on research and price-fixing, and tying arrangements. On the other
hand, Group D governments wish to retain some flexibility in this field and
would provide that such "abusive practices" could be deemed nonobjection-
able if the competent national authorities of the acquiring party's country
consider such a determination to be in the public interest.
68
In fact, apart from the political need to be seen as supporters of the
developing nations, the CMEA bloc may not be interested in the debate over
the conduct and role of MNCs in international trading relationships. They
see it as a historical problem which is not of their making.
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Some commentators in the West also feel that the strict application of
antitrust rules on companies dealing with the monopolistic enterprises of the
socialist economies put such companies at an unfair disadvantage.7' Al-
though large MNCs have the economic strength to take care of themselves in
dealing with the demands of CMEA trading partners, this is not necessarily
true for small companies, particularly in dealing with the Soviet Union. Its
predilection for large trading partners has already been mentioned, 7' and the
size of its projects is such that a small company will be able to participate in
them only by sharing the financial and other burdens.72 Given the greater
logistical problems for U.S. companies in trading with the CMEA members
directly from their home production units in the United States, the following
perspective of a Soviet minister may be apposite:
Our projects are enormous. Almost every one one of them is worth a
billion dollars. When I deal with European companies they do not have
sufficient industrial, credit and management capacity. When I sign
them up for a large project, I have five or six contracts, which gives me
five or six headaches. When I deal with a large American company, I
have only one headache.
73
This is obviously not true of Fiat, Bayer, Krupp, or ICI. What the comment
may mean is that the Soviet Union and its partners prefer the sheer size of
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the large MNC. After all, even if a particular Western industry became con-
centrated in the hands of one or a few companies, that would still provide
them with a broad and competitive choice of trading partners.
CONCLUSION
The relevance of MNCs' experience with the nonmarket economies seems
evident. There has been very little regulation of MNCs in this respect,
whether on a national, regional, or supranational level. Yet in the last decade
international trading relationships with those economies have grown impres-
sively, surviving even the vagaries of the political relationships between East
and West, to the mutual satisfaction of both economies and their respective
governments.
The reason for this lies in the enlightened mutual self-interest on both
sides. The MNCs have not sought to subvert the CMEA societies or to impose
methods of business upon them. Rather they have utilized their entrepreneur-
ial flexibility to develop new forms of business relationships which do not
impose strains on the political theories of their partners. The nonmarket
economies have taken a pragmatic and nondogmatic approach to trade with
MNCs, explicitly recognizing, for example, the profit motivation of their for-
eign partners, in their foreign investment legislation.
To quote the words of Henri Schamm: "Clearly, business cannot prosper
unless the host country itself has a chance to achieve prosperity; thus a
responsible MNE will take into consideration, out of self-interest, the eco-
nomic and social needs of the country in which it operates."74 Such an
approach has characterized much of the relationship between MNCs and
the nonmarket economies. Yet perhaps the alien nature of those economies
and the subtle encouragement of size which they emanate pose a dilemma
which has been stated by Mr. Pisar and acknowledged by Mr. Davidow:
I am raising a philosophical and a practical question. How are we going
to react to what is happening abroad? Are we going to say to ourselves
we must change our system in order to be able to meet the new kind of
trade and competition problems that arise abroad or are we going to
preserve our system intact?
75
Such a question exaggerates the current circumstances of East-West trade,
but it may do more than hint at the direction in which that relationship is
evolving. Perhaps it is even more relevant to other aspects of the interna-
tional trading relationships of the Western industrialized democracies and
their market economies. Furthermore, this question is pertinent to U.S. anti-
trust officials and legislators who are pondering the proper response to corpo-
rate concentration both in the United States and abroad. It may be that the
possible repercussions of any anticoncentration measures on East-West trade
relations should be more fully discussed before concrete action is taken.
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